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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
into the proposed agreement. When Empire sought an injunction,
neither the state court nor the United States Supreme Court had
any difficulty in disposing of the defendants' contention that
their right of free speech would be violated if the picketing were
to be enjoined. Said Justice Black for a unanimous court: "It
rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute. We reject the contention now. '25
The decision is an important one, and is undoubtedly correct.
Although the Giboney case is under the first of the picketing-free
speech cases in which the United States Supreme Court has
based its decision on the unlawfulness of purpose of the picket-
ing, the state courts have almost without exception upheld in-
junctions where the picketing sought to induce a violation of a
state statute.26 It is submitted that the decision does not extend
the area of permissible state regulation of picketing, but simply
reaffirms principles which had already been indicated in earlier
decisions. In other words, the decision serves only to define more
sharply the extent of the area of permissible state regulation
already roughly outlined by the court.
ELLIS C. MAGEE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREsT-On Feb-
ruary 1, 1943, a printer who was in possession of plates for
forging overprints on stamps was taken into custody. He dis-
closed that the defendant was one of the customers to whom he
sold and delivered the forged overprints. On February 6, 1943,
officers were sent to purchase from the defendant stamps bear-
ing overprints. These stamps were reported to be forgeries on
February 9, and on the 16th of the same month officers armed
with a warrant for the arrest of the defendant went to the de-
fendant's place of business, arrested him, and over his protest
conducted a search of his desk, safe, and file cabinet, the search
lasting approximately one and a half hours, during the course
of which a large number of stamps upon which overprints had
been forged were found. The second count of the indictment
charged the defendant with keeping in his possession 573 forged
stamps. At the trial the defendant made timely motion for the
25. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684,
688, 93 L.Ed. 649, 654 (1949).
26. Note (1949) 28 Ore. L. Rev. 391, 393, and the cases there cited.
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suppression of the evidence pertaining to the second count, but
it was denied. Held, that the search and seizure was lawful as
an incident of a legal arrest, despite the fact that the arresting
officers had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant. The Court
also overruled Trupiano v United States1 insofar as it required a
search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of pro-
curing it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after
a lawful arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S. Ct. 430, 49
L. Ed. 407 (1950).
In the principal case the problem of search and seizure with-
out a warrant, incidental to lawful arrest, again confronted the
United States Supreme Court; and that Court, consistent in its
inconsistent manner of handling this problem, reversed itself
within a period of two years. However, it appears that a degree
of certainty previously lacking has been brought to this question,
though, in the writer's opinion, the price paid for certainty was
almost complete removal of the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment 2 against unlawful searches and seizures as incidents of a
lawful arrest.
It has long been recognized by the Supreme Court that
within certain limits a right of search and seizure without a war-
rant but as an incident of a lawful arrest was permissible,3 but
the Court has been hard put to define these limitations and for
the past four years has been constantly redefining them much
to the confusion 4 of the lower federal courts and the arresting
officers. A definable standard as to what is a reasonable and an
unreasonable search and seizure is necessary in order to deter-
mine whether the evidence seized by the arresting officers is
admissible or inadmissible at the trial. The policy of excluding
evidence, "The Federal Rule," was founded upon a principle set
forth in Boyd v. United States,5 and was first applied in Weeks
1. 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
3. United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 407 (1950).
4. Justice Black, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430,
445, 94 L.Ed. 407, 414 (1950).
5. 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). Due to the limited crimi-
nal jurisdiction possessed by the federal courts until the end of the nine-
teenth century (Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution [1947] 106), and due to the fact
that until the last quarter of that century the accused in a federal court
was excluded from testifying at all (Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construc-
tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause, Selected Essays on Constitutional Law
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v. United States." It requires the defendant, if he has knowledge
of the seizure, to petition the Court for the return of the evidence
before the trial. Failure to do so will estop him from objecting
to the unreasonableness of the search when the evidence is in-
troduced. A later extension of the rule permits the defendant
who is unaware of the search and seizure to attack collaterally
7
the admissibility of the evidence unreasonably obtained. This
procedural device has been most effective in protecting the de-
fendant's substantive rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The right to search the person of the accused concurrent
with a valid arrest and to search and seize the fruits, tools, or
evidence of the crime has long been sanctioned.8 The reason
given for this is that it is necessary to protect the arresting offi-
cer, to deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape, 'and
to avoid the destruction of the evidenceY A search of a ship, an
airplane, an automobile or other moving vehicle without a war-
rant, either incidental to arrest or otherwise, has also been sanc-
tioned by the Court.10
Attempts to enlarge the limitations placed on search and
seizure incidental to a lawful arrest were, with one exception,
rejected by the courts until recently. Thus, in Weeks v. United
States," search of the defendant's room after he was arrested at
his place of employment was held unreasonable in that no search
warrant had been obtained. In Silverthorne Lumber Company
v. United States 2 search of the defendant's office after arrest at
home and the seizure, photographing for trial purposes, and
replacement of evidence found in the office were held unreason-
able as an incident of a lawful arrest. In Agnello v. United
States 8 the Court held that, though the right to search the per-
son and immediate surroundings of a man upon arrest is un-
questionable, it does not follow that his dwelling three blocks
away may be searched.
[1938] 1408) the question of unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment did not become an issue until the Boyd case, which was
decided in 1886.
6. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
7. This has been codified in Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 41(e) (1946).
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
9. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70
S.Ct. 430, 437, 94 L.Ed. 407, 417 (1950).
10. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925);
Bringer v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1375 (1948).
11. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
12. 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920).
13. 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 LEd. 145 (1925).
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However, the Court in Marron v. United States1 4 appeared
to have abandoned the above view, and the case seemed to stand
for the proposition that a general search for unspecified articles
was permissible insofar as it was in connection with a lawful
arrest. In that case, the defendant was arrested in the act of
selling liquor, and a ledger behind the bar which showed entries
of liquor purchases was seized. The rule of the Marron case was
drastically modified by Go-Bart Importing Company v. United
States5 and by United States v. Lefkowitz, 1 in which it was
emphasized that the articles seized in the Marron case were in
plain view, thus alleviating the necessity of a general ransacking
of the premises;' 7 they were instrumentalities used in conducting
criminal enterprise; and they were in the immediate control of
the defendant, who was apprehended in the commission of the
crime in the presence of officers. "Thus explained, Marron stands
merely for the historically justified right to seize visible instru-
ments of crime at the scene of the arrest.' '18 In both the Go-Bart
and Lefkowitz cases, quite extensive searches of premises inci-
dental to a lawful arrest were held by the Court to be in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amenldment.
These cases, Weeks v. United States through United States
v. Lefkowitz, limited the arresting officer who was without a
search warrant to searching and seizing only those things that
were on the physical person of the defendant or under his im-
mediate control in plain view or in a place where they could
be seized without a forceful ransacking and rummaging of the
place. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has reexamined
intensively the whole problem raised by these cases.
The first case to reexamine the question of search and seizure
incidental to a lawful arrest was Davis v. United States.'9 Fed-
eral officers without a search warrant approached the defendant,
who was suspected of selling gasoline in violation of the Office
.of Price Administration rationing requirements (a misdemean-
or), and arrested him outside his business premises. After an
hour of pressure the defendant acquiesced to the demands of the
14. 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927).
15. 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 LEd. 374 (1931).
16. 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932).
17. It does not appear from the facts in the Marron case that the ledger
was in plain view, nor does the Court there indicate that there was no ran-
sacking of the premises.
18. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70
S.Ct. 430, 441, 94 L.Ed. 407, 420 (1950).
19. 328 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946).
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officers and opened a locked room, producing ration coupons and
a book evidencing purchases and sales of gasoline. The Court held
that the evidence was admissible on the grounds that the search
and seizure was reasonable as an incident of a lawful arrest. Jus-
tice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated that the surrender
of the evidence was voluntary and that arresting officers are
granted greater latitude in searching for public records than in
searching for private papers. 20 This was the first of several one-
vote majority cases to arise in connection with this problem; it
was a 4-3 decision with Justices Douglas, Reed, Burton, and Black
in the majority and Justices Murphy, Rutledge, and Frankfurter
in the minority. Chief Justice Vinson had not yet been appointed
to the Court, and Justice Jackson was absent.
The movement toward extending the permissible area in
which a search and seizure coexistent with a valid arrest would
be sanctioned by the Court was given further emphasis in Harris
v. United States. 21 Officers armed with a valid warrant for the
arrest of the defendant accused of passing forged checks in vio-
lation of the Mail Fraud Statute and the National Stolen Prop-
erty Act arrested the defendant and gave his four-room apart-
ment a five-hour search, ostensibly looking for two cancelled
forged checks. In the course of the search the officers came across
a number of draft notices and registration certificates. As a
result of this evidence the defendant was convicted of violating
the Selective Training and Service Act. The Court sustained the
admission of the evidence, in spite of the lack of a search war-
rant, as a reasonable search concurrent with a valid arrest. The
doctrine of the right to search and seize things in the immediate
control of the defendant was extended to include a four-room
apartment under the theory that the whole apartment was in
the control of the defendant.22 In sustaining the seizure, the
Court stated that the possession of the draft cards by the de-
fendant was a continuing crime against the laws of the United
States which was being committed in the presence of the agents
20. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in a strong dissent that surrender
of evidence after an hour's persuasion by federal officers could hardly be
called voluntary. As the offense was only a misdemeanor a search warrant
could not have been obtained and thus more could be accomplished without
a search warrant than with one. The distinction between private and pub-
lic papers is that private papers cannot be seized due to the self-incrimina-
tion restriction, while public papers can be seized only upon proper legal
sanctions.
21. 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 LEd. 1399 (1947).
22. The question as to the Court's attitude if the four-room apartment
had been a fifty room mansion was not answered in the Harris case.
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conducting the search, thereby legalizing seizure of articles
which would have been improper under a warrant to search for
cancelled checks. Justice Murphy in his dissent said, with good
reason, that the decision meant that a warrant for arrest author-
izes an unlimited search from cellar to attic and that a search
warrant is not only unnecessary but a hindrance.23 This case, like
the Davis case, was decided by a one-vote majority, this time by
a 5-4 vote, Chief Justice Vinson having joined the majority and
Justice Jackson the minority.
The problem was next dealt with in Johnson v. United
States.24 Officers went to the defendant's hotel on a tip and,
attracted by the smell of opium coming from her room, arrested
her and searched the room, seizing opium smoking apparatus.
The Court seemed to retreat from the position taken in the
Harris case and held the search and seizure unreasonable be-
cause the officers had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant,
but it is significant that the arrest was not valid and there was
no legal basis to justify the search. For that reason, it cannot
be contended that this case modifies either the Davis or the
Harris case. Justice Douglas shifted from the majority to the
minority, and the old minority became the new majority-a 5-4
decision.
The principle was further extended by the decision in Trup-
iano v. United States, 25 in which federal agents had information
that the defendant was a bootlegger. In February, 1946, one of
the agents went to work for the defendant and kept his superiors
informed as to the defendant's activities. The defendant's still
was raided, and the defendant was legally arrested. Contraband
articles in plain view were seized. The Court admitted the arrest
was valid, but held the search and seizure illegal because the
agents had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant. Thus a
test of the practicability of obtaining a search warrant was
applied to searches and seizures concurrent with a valid arrest.
The Court distinguished Harris v. United States on its facts,
stating that there the records were public and the evidence
seized could not have been known to the arresting officers. But
as there was ample time to obtain a warrant in the Harris case,
it is difficult to conceive that the case was not for all practical
23. See Justice Frankfurter's exhaustive study of the whole problem
of search and seizure in his dissent in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 155, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1104, 91 L.Ed. 1399, 1408 (1947).
24. 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
25. 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948).
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purposes overruled. The Trupiano case was another 5-4 decision,
again illustrating the lack of certainty in this field of the law.
The last case, previous to the principal case, involving this
situation was McDonald v. United States,26 in which the Court
held that a search without a Warrant is not justified unless the
emergencies of the situation make the securing of a warrant im-
practical. This is in line with the Trupiano case. Although there
is doubt concerning the validity of the arrest, Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, handled it as an unreasonable search and
seizure incidental to a valid arrest and held that the seizure was
unreasonable because no emergency made it impractical to ob-
tain the warrant. Justice Black concurred in the result, making
it a 6-3 decision.2 7
Needless to say, the decisions of the five aforementioned
cases confused the lower federal courts and the law enforcement
officials. A clear statement of the law as it stood before United
States v. Rabinowitz is difficult. It appears that the dominant
test was the practicability of obtaining a search warrant. If the
arresting officers had ample time to obtain a search warrant,
then not only was a general searching and ransacking of the
premises held unreasonable, but even the seizure of articles in
plain view. that could be called instrumentalities of the crime
was forbidden. However, the situation was not clear. In spite
of the attempt to distinguish the Harris case in the Trupiano
case, it was apparent that there was a conflict between the deci-
sions. The big question had not been answered-how much of
the rule of the Davis and Harris cases remained in the law after
the Trupiano decision?
The Court answered the question in the Rabinowitz case by
overruling the Trupiano decision and the practicability test and
by substituting a test of reasonableness, to be determined in an
"ad hoc" fashion by the district court. The question was appar-
ently settled. Harris v. United States was reaffirmed, and in
fact, used as authority for the more limited search approved
here. In applying the reasonableness test to the case at hand,
the Court said that the search and seizure was reasonable be-
26. 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).
27. Justice Jackson seems to imply that his test as to what is a reason-
able and what is an unreasonable search and seizure springs not from
constitutionl beliefs concerning the Fourth Amendment but rather is de-
pendent upon the seriousness of the crime-to Justice Jackson, a serious
crime warrants an unreasonable search; a minor crime does not warrant
an unreasonable search. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69
S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 93 L.Ed. 1375, 1388 (1948).
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cause (1) it was an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) it took place
in business premises to which the public was invited, including
the officers, (3) the room was small and under the immediate
and complete control of the defendant, (4) search did not extend
beyond the room used for unlawful purposes, and (5) the posses-
sion of forged stamps was a crime just as it is a crime to possess
burglar's tools.2 s The Marron case was also reaffirmed, and the
majority opinion stated that the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases
had not drained Marron v. United States of its contemporary
vitality. 29 In overruling Trupiano v. United States, much was
made of the hardship that the practicability test imposed on law
enforcement officers and the need to grant them discretion in
exercising judgment.3 0 How much weight the discretion of ar-
resting officers is to have in determining the reasonableness of
the search of the Court did not answer.
In spite of the qualifying language which the Court used
in sustaining this case, it is the writer's view that by reaffirming
the Harris and Marron cases and using the former as authority for
this case, the Court has extended the right to search without a
search warrant while making a lawful arrest from a right to
seize evidence on the defendant's person and under his immedi-
ate control to cover anything in the constructive possession of
the defendant in the premises where the arrest is made and has
completely eliminated the need to obtain a search warrant, no
matter how much advance knowledge the arresting officers may
have had. It does not necessarily follow that because the Court
in United States v. Rabinowitz held that one reason the search
was reasonable there was its limitation to one room, that it could
not be extended to one room and a hall, or to two rooms. It is
difficult, once the idea of seizing only those things in the im-
mediate possession of the defendant is abandoned, to draw a
line short of the entire premises.,1 Surely Harris v. United States,
with its sanction of a search of four rooms, is ample authority
for a more extensive search than the one room searched in the
principal case. Whether the Court will extend the idea of con-
structive possession to articles in the possession of the defendant
but not on the premises is subject only to conjecture; but it
does not appear improbable in light of the extensions already
28. United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430, 434, 94 L.Ed. 407, 412 (1950).
29. 70 S.Ct. 430, 433-434, 94 L.Ed. 407, 412.
30. 70 S.Ct. 430, 435, 94 L.Ed. 407, 413.
31. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct.
430, 441, 94 L.Ed. 407, 420.
1950]
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made that this will happen. The physical limitations that the
Court will place on premises is also indefinite. It is, however,
doubtful that the Court would consider an apartment house or
an entire office building as a premise subject to search in con-
nection with a valid arrest. But it appears safe to say that any
premise that can be said to be under the immediate control of
the defendant is subject to a search and seizure as an incident
of a lawful arrest.
The decision in United States v. Rabinowitz brings a degree
of certainty to this phase of the law that has been lacking since
the pre-Davis days. This is true in spite of the fact that the
Rabinowitz case was a 5-3 decision and that Justice Douglas,
who in light of his past record would more than likely have
voted with the minority, was absent.
During the period that lapsed between the three cases of
Johnson, Trupiano, and McDonald and the case of the United
States v. Rabinowitz, Justices Murphy and Rutledge, who voted
with the majority in those cases, died and were replaced by
Justices Clark and Minton,32 who sided in the Rabinowitz case
with the minority in the above mentioned cases to form a new
majority. In reality, the Rabinowitz case can be considered a
6-3 decision when it is realized that Justice Black's dissent in
that case was not in protest against the extension of the right
to search concurrent with a valid arrest but was motivated by
a desire for certainty, which he felt could be obtained by adher-
ing to the Trupiano rule long enough to see how it worked.3 3
When that is taken in conjunction with his view as expressed by
the Davis and Harris cases, it is not mere conjecture to assume
that if the situation is again presented, Justice Black will side
with the present majority.
A. W. MACY
TORTS-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF STOLEN AUTOMOBILE-A car
owner left his car unattended and unlocked on a public street,
with the key in the ignition. The car was stolen, and in the
getaway the thief negligently drove into and injured plaintiff,
who was exercising reasonable care. Financially responsible car
32. It is interesting to note that both Justice Clark and Justice Minton,
who have long been associated with "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" Civil
Rights programs in other civil liberties questions, sided with the govern-
ment and against civil liberties in this case.
33. Justice Black, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430,
445, 94 L.Ed. 407, 414.
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